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the Hollande–Ayrault administration, drawing comparisons where appropriate with the
previous Sarkozy regime. The limits of President Hollande’s anti-Sarkozy method were
demonstrated in the ﬁrst 2 years; framing state reform and decentralisation in negative
terms prevented the emergence of a coherent legitimising discourse. The empirical data is
interpreted with reference to a comparative ‘States of Convergence’ framework, which is
conceptualised as a heuristic device for analysing variation between places, countries and
policy ﬁelds. The article concludes that the forces of hard convergence are gaining
ground, as economic, epistemic and European pressures continually challenge the forces
of institutional inertia.
French Politics (2014) 12, 104–135. doi:10.1057/fp.2014.7
Keywords: France; decentralisation; state reform; convergence; divergence; Hollande
The online version of this article is available Open Access
Are States in contemporary Europe subject to new forms of convergence under
the impact of economic crisis, enhanced European steering and international
monitoring? Or is the evolution of governance (national, and in this case, sub-
national) driven fundamentally by diverging, mainly domestic pressures? A fuller
answer to this question requires a comparative framing, but the dynamics of
convergence and divergence are also played out in speciﬁc contexts within individual
countries. This article considers the case of France. The article combines analysis of
the state modernisation and decentralisation reforms under the Hollande presidency,
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thereby taking at face value the claim for a more joined-up style of government. Both
programmes were presented as forming part of a broader effort to restore the public
ﬁnances in a delicate European and world context, as linked weapons in the target to
meet the zero structural deﬁcit promise by 2017.
As our article involves only one case, interpretation of the data is facilitated by
reference to an analytical framework developed as part of a broader comparative
study.1 A ‘States of Convergence’ typology is proposed as the starting point for
understanding the interplay between convergence and divergence pressures on the
one hand, and processes of national and territorial adaptation and translation on the
other. The typology identiﬁes four distinct forms of policy convergence and
divergence. ‘Hard’ convergence is ‘top-down’ in nature. It operates on the basis of
clear institutional and policy templates and commitment to ‘download’ these; it
involves speciﬁc criteria, intrusive monitoring and sometimes sanctions for non-
compliance. A soft convergence perspective emphasises the exchange of policy
relevant information, benchmarking ‘best practice’ or at least cognisance of other
models. In our typology, soft divergence focuses on a speciﬁc form of lesson-
drawing or policy learning whereby organisations and institutions construct them-
selves against perceived negative models. Our ﬁnal position is labelled hard
divergence, which is understood in terms of the persistence of deep underlying
structures that pre-shape institutional pathways. It is caused by the path-dependent
development of institutions (historical institutionalism, Pierson, 2000; Steinmo,
2008), economies (represented in distinct ways by the varieties of capitalism, Hall
and Soskice, 2001 and worlds of welfare, Esping-Anderson, 2013 literatures) or
bounded governance concepts (see below). The typology is outlined in Table 1.
Table 1 summarises the theoretical framework.2 Results are the outcomes
described by the concepts of convergence and divergence. The concepts of hard and
soft refer to mechanisms. Mechanisms are dynamics that can be driven or constrained
by processes emerging and evolving at different dimensions of collective action:
for example, structures, ideas, institutions and interaction. For instance, new ideas
can support soft convergence, while economic or political constraints cause hard
divergence; institutionalised modes of multilevel governance might lead to hard or
Table 1: States of convergence
Results
Convergence Divergence
Mechanisms Soft Lesson drawing, policy learning,
benchmarking, cognitive Europeanisation
Constructed divergence against
negative models
Hard EU regulation, ﬁscal pressure, economic
competition, ranking
and rating
Path-dependent institutions,
varieties of capitalism, concepts
of ‘bounded’ governance
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soft convergence, whereas institutional dynamics inside states and regions cause
persisting divergence. Variation and contingency are the norm; regularities can
emerge from sustained empirical investigation and comparison. In his work on causal
mechanisms, Tilly (2001) stresses the likely combination of what he labels as
environmental, relational and cognitive variables, but warns that ‘we cannot decide in
general or in advance how the elements interact’ (p. 38). The article draws inspiration
from Tilly in particular, and proposes the adaptation of the States of Convergence to
the linked ﬁelds of state reform and decentralisation in Hollande’s France. State
modernisation and decentralisation can be analysed as a single or linked phenom-
enon, but the case study makes most sense if framed in a broader (environmental,
cognitive and relational) and at least implicitly comparative context. This argument
is developed most fully in the concluding section, but is presented brieﬂy here.
Processes of hard and soft convergence and divergence affect the Politics
of Austerity in Hollande’s France in different ways depending on whether formal
outputs, informal outcomes, political discourses or institutional innovations are
considered. Hard convergence might describe the ambition of the European Central
Bank (ECB) or the European Commission to enact zero deﬁcit budgetary rules
within the EU, for example, or to engage in enhanced monitoring of welfare or
local government expenditure. The increased propensity of Eurostat to challenge
national statistics is a powerful driver of convergence, as is the obligation to respect
new European Commission ﬁscal governance norms.3 Converging pressures do not,
of course, necessarily produce converging outcomes; the endogenous capture of
policy processes might occur in ﬁelds, such as local government reform, that are
high on the political agenda and under close observation from the EU and other
international organisations. Processes of hard divergence might prove more powerful
than injunctions to conform to international standards. They are sustained by deeply
ingrained state traditions, party structures or widely understood collective action
repertoires that tie-in domestic institutional developments in a path-dependent
manner. Mechanisms are dynamics that can be driven or constrained by processes
emerging and evolving across different dimensions of collective action; the value
of the States of Convergence typology is that it accommodates these tensions and –
at best – offers partial causal insights.
Thus deﬁned, the States of Convergence framework adds value as it draws on
different types of explanation and levels of analysis: material macro-level variables
(economic indicators, institutional pathways or legal orders); middle-level explana-
tions of speciﬁc reforms and institutional conﬁgurations (bureau shaping strategies,
interest mobilisation, institutional path dependencies); individual or group-level
discursive dynamics (via forms of emulation, ‘othering’ and discursive legitimisa-
tion). The States of Convergence framework engages fully with questions of
structure and agency. Hard convergence and hard divergence are best conceived as
structural mechanisms that allow limited room for human agency. Soft convergence
and soft divergence are better conceptualised as processes that actively bridge the
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two dimensions of structure and agency. They each involve forms of positive
discursive legitimisation of choices adopted, as well as representations of negative
models (Schmidt, 2011). They imply strategic choices being made to embrace the
logic of convergence or, on the contrary, to assert the appropriateness of existing
institutions and interactions. The ensuing discussion will demonstrate that causal
mechanisms might follow these levels of analysis.
How does this framework add value to the existing literature? A generation of
scholars has reinvigorated debates in the ﬁeld of state reform and decentralisation in
France. It lies beyond the limits of this article to undertake a longer dissertation on the
nature of valid explanations, or the status of the meta-theoretical debates under-
pinning the work of individual scholars; this would be of limited interest to the
reader. A number of approaches have the most direct relevance for understanding
state reform and decentralisation under President Hollande, the object addressed in
this article and special issue. Four main dimensions might be identiﬁed from the
existing literature, none of which contains the valid explanation that might pretend
to Covering Law status (Tilly, 2001), but all of which contribute to meaningful
reﬂection and are encompassed in some form by the States of Convergence typology.
The dimensions are time and temporal dynamics, scale and rescaling, institutions and
actor conﬁgurations and policy dynamics.
What is the temporal dimension? And how is time conceptualised? Is time
understood as a series of bounded episodes? Or as precise choices linked to the
sequence of reform? Le Lidec (2011b), for example, emphasises the importance of
sequencing, as well as the tie-in of foundational trajectories in his major contribution
to French decentralisation.4 Is time best captured as an iterative processes, as with
Pasquier’s (2004, 2012) concept of territorial political capacity, whereby territorial
elites and social groups produce a vision of the world that allows them to structure
relations among themselves and to deﬁne the ‘interests’ that they are pursuing
collectively. Both approaches are important; they provide material or constructed
explanations that are valuable in their own terms of reference. This article considers
the case of state reform and decentralisation under Hollande. For the sake of
analytical clarity, it adopts a narrow time-frame (the ﬁrst 2 years of the Hollande
presidency, allowing comparison with the Sarkozy period).
What are the important spatial dimensions, and how important are debates about
re-scaling (Négrier, 2011)? There are potentially competing literatures about space
and scale that are relevant to this article. Our position of hard convergence is inﬂu-
enced by the literature that emphasises the converging dynamics of the international
political economy (Dyson, 2014), new forms of central steering (Epstein, 2006,
2013, Bezes, 2009); public management (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Eymeri-
Douzans and Pierre, 2011) and Europeanisation (Graziano and Vink, 2007; Ladrech,
2010) that is developed more fully in the next section. This literature generally
underplays speciﬁc places. A similarly dense literature focuses on the diverging
outcomes produced by multi-level governance, new regionalism and territorial
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capacity building (Keating, 1998; Keating et al, 2003; Piatonni, 2010; Pasquier et al,
2013), a literature that makes most sense in our ﬁnal empirical section. In the
narrower ﬁeld of French decentralisation, Pasquier (2012), Barone (2011) and Dupuy
and Pollard (2014) have developed the core expertise in terms of regional govern-
ance; Pinson (2009), Le Galès (2001, 2002), Payre (2010) and others have demon-
strated the speciﬁc logics of cities and urban spaces. Insofar as it integrates the
territorial dimension, the article draws on interviews in central government, one
region (Brittany) and two cities (Rennes and Brest) since 2010.5
Institutions, instruments and actor conﬁgurations form a third dimension (espe-
cially Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004; Bezes, 2007; Epstein, 2013). Debates about
policy instruments contribute indirectly to our reﬂection, especially in terms of the
potentially converging outputs produced by the Europeanised instruments (such as
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)) considered below. The analysis of speciﬁc
policy instruments sometimes lends support to a hard convergence approach, or at
least identiﬁes common trends through detailed investigation of speciﬁc cases.6
Processes of soft convergence rely in part on the concept of isomorphism, drawn
from early new institutionalist analysis: this concept refers to the tendency of
institutions to observe each other and to copy models of successful practice (Powell
and DiMaggio, 1991). Other forms of new institutionalist analysis are required to
make sense of the capacity of speciﬁc institutions to achieve discursive credibility,
which is important in our framework for understanding softer forms of convergence
and divergence. Schmidt’s (2010) discursive institutionalism provides a useful
constructivist counter-weight to process tracing accounts. Discursive institutionalism
invites attention to the goodness of ﬁt between speciﬁc discursive registers and policy
outcomes, of key relevance when considering the Hollande presidency. Explicit
process tracing accounts, which emphasise the role of old institutions and instru-
ments in shaping legislative and policy outcomes over the long term, are also of key
contextual importance. Le Lidec’s (2007) work in particular brings to the fore the
role of the French second chamber, the Senate and the local government associations
as powerful domestic veto players shaping the pathways of reforms. Finally, ‘policy
sector’ is, at least, a useful metaphor to differentiate between different types of
policymaking activities and the range of political and professional interests
associated with them (Dupuy and Pollard, 2014).
The States of Convergence framework provides a heuristic device for analysing
variation between places, countries and policy ﬁelds. It sits naturally within an
approach labelled as contingent governance (developed in the ﬁnal section), whereby
context, conceptualised as an intervening variable, is understood as a ﬁlter of change.
The States of Convergence framework (and the contingent governance approach that
underpins it) adds value, insofar as it attaches importance to theorisation on the basis
of a mix of material and constructed data across distinct levels of analysis.
The framework of analysis is thus appropriate to the research question in hand.
The States of Convergence framework here is applied to the speciﬁc cases of state
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modernisation and decentralisation, but is designed also to have a broader utility
(insofar as it points to varying types of causal mechanism or narratives). The article
now considers convergences, taking as its starting point the widely cited deﬁnition of
convergence is as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop
similarities in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, 1983, p. 3).
Convergences
Our ﬁrst strong hypothesis is that of convergence (Bennett, 1991; Pollitt, 2001; Knill,
2005; Holzinger et al, 2007). Contemporary European States are subject to powerful
and potentially converging transnational economic, ideational and institutional
pressures, which arguably spillover into their management of inter-governmental
relations. Different empirical referents of hard convergence might encompass ﬁscal
coordination (Dyson, 2014), technical norms (Borraz, 2007), policy conditionality
(Page, 2000), policy instruments (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004, 2012), respect for
formal democratic and market norms by the European Union (EU), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or the external imposition of tough
performance indicators by these international organisations (Eymeri-Douzans and
Pierre, 2011). But what do we mean by convergence? Convergence of what? Of
outputs, processes or norms? There are two versions of a convergence hypothesis:
hard and soft. The relationship between economic crisis and territorial governance is
interpreted in this article as a contender for hard convergence (especially in the ﬁeld
of public ﬁnances), as is a certain form of Europeanisation. Soft convergence, on the
other hand, is better captured either in terms of institutional isomorphism or looser
pressures to join up state modernisation and decentralisation reforms.
If the hard convergence hypothesis is robust then broader exogenous ﬁscal,
economic and political pressures drive domestic policy change. In extreme cases, such
as that of Greece, where the Troika (the European Commission, the IMF and the ECB)
has intervened directly in domestic institutional arrangements, there would appear to be
a clear association between externally imposed efforts at state retrenchment and
domestic policy change (Zahariadis, 2012). More routinely, convergence presupposes
an increasing oversight by the EU into internal budgetary affairs, including local
government and welfare expenditures. Across Europe, devolved or regional govern-
ments are facing a new reality of enhanced international economic monitoring
(embodied by the ratings agencies), European budgetary supervision (the ‘Six Pack’,
the Treaty on Stability, Growth and Governance (TSGG)) and a reinvigorated EU-level
control over member-states and their sub-state governments. In Germany, for instance,
demands for greater Länder autonomy from more powerful regions have run against
countervailing trends of ﬁscal equalisation, tighter federal controls over expenditure
and borrowing, central deﬁnitions of minimal standards in ﬁelds such as education and
administration and a model of European integration that has challenged traditional
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Land competencies (Benz, 2007; Vetter, 2010). In Spain, the economic crisis has
produced new budgetary and regulatory controls over the autonomous communities
(Colino, 2013).7 Even in highly decentralised Belgium, the economic crisis has
empowered the Belgian central bank in its dealing with the regions and communities.8
A hard convergence hypothesis would posit a direct causal relationship
between budgetary (debt and deﬁcit) imbalances and (ultimately successful) reforms
to rein-in public expenditure. The context of the Hollande presidency since 2012
is one of growing external attention on structural imbalances, leading to critical
assessments by the IMF (2013) and the European Commission (2014). The scale
of the public debt challenge faced by the Valls government is immense. The overall
public debt (deﬁned in terms of the Maastricht criteria) had been 64.2 per cent at
the start of the Sarkozy period in 2007, but by 2013 it was approaching 90 per cent and
was predicted by the IMF (2013) to peak at 95 per cent in 2015. The current account
deﬁcit had been brought down to 4.3 per cent in 2013 (from 7.5 per cent in 2009), but
was still well above the ofﬁcial target of 3.7 per cent. The Stability Pact target of 3 per
cent has now slipped to 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2013). The public
sector, broadly deﬁned, had accounted for 52 per cent of GDP at the start of the
Sarkozy period in 2007, but by 2013 it was approaching 57 per cent, just behind
Denmark (Marois, 2013). This constrained ﬁnancial setting fed through into new
pressures on the public sector broadly conceived, including local government, welfare
organisations and agencies. A critical Court of Accounts report published in early
2014 identiﬁed further retrenchment in the ﬁeld of local and regional authorities as a
top priority for expenditure reductions (Cour des comptes, 2014).
The European Commission ﬁnally granted the French government a delay – to
2015 rather than 2013 – for meeting the deﬁcit criteria of the EU Stability Pact
(deﬁcit at 3 per cent and debt at 60 per cent of GDP). The counter-part was a
commitment that structural reforms be undertaken, a euphemism for cutting public
expenditure by tackling pensions, reforming the labour market and overhauling
public administration. The Ayrault–Hollande administration (May 2012–March
2014) gave out mixed messages in relation to structural reform. The Competitiveness
Pact (CICE) of November 2012, the labour market agreement of 18 January 2013 and
pension reform all suggested some recognition of the problems of economic
competitiveness and public debt.9 Evidence from the ﬁrst 22 months also strongly
pointed to taxation increases (rather than public expenditure cuts) as being the main
policy response of the Ayrault government to the problem of public debt, a ﬁscal
choice criticised by the European Commission (2013). It is too early to provide
a response to the question of whether a harder form of convergence will affect the
policy outcomes of the Socialist-led government; but the reduction of business taxes
(the ﬁgure of 50 billion euros was announced in Hollande’s pacte de responsabilité
of January 2014), along with some tightening of control over local and regional
government ﬁnances (and the much more consequential social security budget), goes
in the direction of the international competitiveness agenda.
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The EU is sometimes presented as the symbol of hard convergence, especially for
euro-sceptics. Has Europeanisation gone too far? The analytical value of Europeani-
sation has been challenged in some recent articles (Graziano and Vink, 2007;
Bolleyer and Radaelli, 2009; Cole and Pasquier, 2012). For Graziano and Vink
(2007), for example, Europeanisation must produce policy change if it is to be
validated as a concept. Policy transformation involves a change in objectives,
principles, procedures and ﬁnancial instruments; policy recalibration requires two of
the above, while policy inertia signiﬁes no variation. This contingent approach is
similar to that adopted by Cole and Drake (2000), for whom Europeanisation is best
understood as an independent variable, or a causal mechanism of policy transforma-
tion, where the direction of change and causality runs clearly from the EU (and its
multiple institutions) to member-states and regions and where EU decisions bind
successor governments. In 2012, François Hollande campaigned against the ratiﬁcation
of the EU Fiscal Compact Treaty, engineered by his predecessor Sarkozy and
Chancellor Merkel, which introduces the golden rule of virtually balanced budgets.
After a few months in ofﬁce, Hollande announced a volte face, and announced that
France would ratify the TSGG, following the Constitutional Council’s decision that the
new treaty could be approved by means of an organic law (rather than a constitutional
amendment). The TSGG, agreed in December 2011 and signed in 2012 by 25 of the
(then) 27 EU member states, strengthened the automatic penalties to be paid by states
who are unable to control their debt, or to bring into line their budgets to zero deﬁcits
by 2015. Reversed Qualiﬁed Majority Voting (RQMV) will make it much more
difﬁcult for states to avoid automatic penalties should they prove unable to fulﬁl the
strict Stability Pact criteria.10 The TSGG came after a signiﬁcant ﬁscal and budgetary
tightening in the form of the Six Pack and the Two Pack, allowing the European
Commission, through the European semester process, a much more intrusive oversight
into national budgets (including commenting on national budgets before they have
passed the parliamentary stage).11 The European Semester process produces annual
reports on the strengths and, more usually, structural weaknesses of all EU states
(including those, such as the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, not having
signed the TSGG). The details of these reports ﬁlter down into ﬁelds such as the housing
market, wage indexation, pension ages: the core of traditional economic sovereignty.
The direct consequences of the TSGG on local and regional authorities appear
limited in the French case. As representatives of local government associations pointed
out in interviews, local authorities are legally bound to present balanced budgets.12
Numerous competencies dealt with by local and regional authorities are potentially
concerned by stricter budgetary rules, however, especially in those areas of infra-
structure and investment such as road building, urban transport or schools
that require long-term capital investment. The EU dimension also plays itself out in
terms of local public services. In part under pressures from EU competition policy, the
French state has gradually moved away from being a competitive provider of technical
assistance to communes. Local authorities have had great difﬁculties in complying
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with EU public services legislation. They have had to devise expensive means for
tendering out public service delivery and complying with the rules of public
procurement. The speciﬁc rules for the provision of inter-communal services, whereby
cross subsidies are considered as state aids, has created great practical difﬁculties for
the smallest communes in providing basic public services (Duperon, 2011).
Irrespective of whether direct EU inﬂuence can be identiﬁed, the external con-
text (EU and international organisations) weighs increasingly heavily on domestic
management. Controlling local government ﬁnance represents one central feature
of the state’s close involvement in localities (Hertzog, 2010; Le Lidec, 2011a;
Steckel, 2012). In 2012, French local government represented just over 20 per cent
of the overall total public expenditure and 71 per cent of public investment (Laignel
and Guené, 2013). From the perspective of an economy-minded central government,
local government expenditure has increased well beyond its sustainable level. There
was a substantial increase in transfers to local authorities in the period from 2003
to 2011. One source calculates that State transfers to local authorities rose by
31 per cent over the period, excluding the transfers of competencies from central
government that were accompanied with speciﬁc additional funds (Botella, 2012).
The average rise in local government expenditure was 4.8 per cent per annum over
the period, set against an inﬂation rate of 1.6 per cent (Botella, 2012). There has also
been a signiﬁcant growth of local government employment (Biland, 2012; Bouquet,
2013). According to one source, in 2012 the local government sector represented
34 per cent of public sector workers in France and 7 per cent of total employment
(Nunes, 2013). The communal bloc is by far the main provider of local government
employment, provoking criticisms, such as those voiced by PS deputy Dosière or by
a critical Court of Accounts report in 2013, that communes continue to employ staff
even when competencies have been transferred upwards to the inter-communal
level (Dosière, 2012; Cour des comptes, 2013). Local and regional authorities and
their associations argue, on the other hand, that central government transferred
new service delivery responsibilities in the 2004 decentralisation Act without
adequate ﬁnancial compensation.13 The transfer of ancillary and technical staff
working in high schools from central to regional control, in particular, greatly
increased the numbers of staff working in the departments and regions.14
The key decision to limit further local ﬁnancial autonomy was taken during
the Sarkozy presidency, responding to the political imperative to lower business
taxes.15 In a move reminiscent of Thatcher in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, the
Fillon government announced in 2010 the abolition of the local collection and setting
of business rates (taxe professionnelle), and its replacement by a more centralised
formula-based method of tax collection, considerably limiting the ﬁscal autonomy
of local authorities, especially the departments and regions (Hertzog, 2010; Steckel,
2012). The effects of this radical move were immediate; from 2010 to 2012, the
proportion of local government ﬁnances raised by local taxes declined from
50 per cent to 20 per cent for the departments and from 38 per cent to 10 per cent
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for the regions (DGCL, 2013).16 This nationalisation of the local tax base was criticised
by the Socialists while in opposition, but the Hollande–Ayrault administration did not
rescind the measure. The regions now depend on central government transfers or
formulae for 90 per cent of their resource. The only local tax that the 101 departmental
councils can vary is that of the built land tax (taxe sur le foncier bati) one of the four
historic taxes.17 The inter-communal public corporations (EPCI) have fared relatively
better, gaining a share of dynamic household taxes in the new formulae used by central
government to distribute grants to local and regional authorities (Guengant, 2012).18
Future perspectives for ﬁnancing local government are much tighter than in the golden
decade from 2000 to 2010. The main transfer – the dotation globale de fonctionnement,
DGF – has been frozen since 2011 and is scheduled to decline by 3 billion euros in
2014 and 2015 (Le Monde, 2013).
These various factors strengthen arguments based on hard convergence: at the very
least, the external context (the EU and other international organisations) weighs
increasingly heavily on domestic public management and choices. The direction of
change is broadly similar across euro-zone countries. Convergence pressures are never
simply implemented according to a trans-national template, however; they require
strategic and discursive choices that lie more squarely within the realm of human
agency. We now consider soft convergence and soft divergence as actor-focused
processes, involving a mix of strategic choices and discursive legitimisations.
Soft convergence
Soft convergence, in our framework, involves a more or less conscious effort to
import institutions, instruments or ideas that have demonstrated their worth
elsewhere. The concept draws on Rose’s (1991, p. 21) analysis of lesson-drawing,
which he deﬁnes as ‘a program for action based on a program or programs
undertaken in another city, state or nation, or by the same organisation in the past’.
Within the relevant literature, the effectiveness of this process is contingent on
a range of factors, such as the availability of information, comparability of cases
and a capacity for institutional isomorphism (Evans and Davies, 1999; Dolowitz
and Marsh, 2000; Radaelli, 2005; Payre and Pollet, 2013). A soft convergence
perspective emphasises the regular exchange of policy-relevant information,
benchmarking ‘best practice’ or at least cognisance of other models. The proxies
identiﬁed as potential indicators of soft convergence are new public management
(NPM) and the importing of policy programmes from elsewhere.
Do governments look to lessons from abroad? There were several similarities
between the state reform programmes under Sarkozy (2007–2012) and Hollande
(since 2012), the RGPP and the MAP, both claiming their inspiration from the
example of Canada in the 1990s. But this example is also routinely evoked by other
state reformers (for example, the British Conservatives in 2010, with the
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implementation of the Comprehensive Spending Review, far more radical in scope
than state reform programmes under Sarkozy and Hollande). To conclude that a
mainly instrumental use is made of speciﬁc foreign examples (such as Canada for
state reform, or Finland for education) would appear pertinent. The broader question,
beyond speciﬁc cases, is framed by Eymeri-Douzans (2013) in terms of whether
France is ‘within the world movement’ in terms of administrative reform. Is there a
French-style NPM and, if so, does this make a difference in terms of territorial
governance? The rise and trans-national diffusion, ﬁrst within OECD countries and
then worldwide, of NPM has been remarkable since the early 1980s (Hood, 1998). The
content of this neo-managerialist repertoire includes well-known features such as
agenciﬁcation, benchmarking, performance indicators, accreditation procedures, citi-
zens’ charters, management by objectives, programme budgeting, one-stop-shops,
public–private partnerships and delegation of public missions to private entities. These
ﬂagship recipes and techniques have repeatedly been broadcasted as ‘best practices’ in
international and European forums (Cole and Eymeri-Douzans, 2010).
Interviewees in the Finance ministry in 2010 willingly described Sarkozy’s
General Policy Review (Révision générale des politiques publiques – RGPP) as
a ‘French-style pubic management’.19 There was greater openness, under Sarkozy,
to diffusion of international models of best practice such as NPM, speciﬁcally the
emphasis on outputs, attainment of results and the involvement of private sector
consultants and operators.20 There was some evidence of synoptic reform under
Sarkozy, especially during the early period: the RGPP (see below), the merging
of corps (Gervais, 2010), the fusion of bureaux (especially those responsible for
calculating and collecting taxes, the DGFP (direction générale des ﬁnances
publiques) and DGI (direction générale des impôts)), the emphasis on performance
indicators, along with some mild reforms to the system of competitive examina-
tions21 and timid measures of performance-related pay. At the very least, there was
an embrace of the language of NPM and reference to broader international trends
and best practices.22 Efforts were undertaken to reduce administrative duplication
within the state (especially via the reform of the territorial state (the RéATE) and
the General Policy Review (RGPP)) and to tackle problems of central–local
relations (the law of 2 December 2010) (Bezes, 2010; Bezes and Le Lidec, 2010;
Cole, 2011, 2012; Péneau, et al., 2012). Local government, however, was not
subject to the two principal NPM approaches adopted in France in recent years: the
budgetary law (LOLF) in operation since 2001, or the General Policy Review
(RGPP) that held sway under President Sarkozy (2007–2012).23
The above discussion elucidates the limits of direct learning from foreign
administrations. There remains a speciﬁc intellectual puzzle involving debates
around governance; how are broad transnational trends, such as NPM, domesticated
or obviated in different contexts (Kuhlmann, 2010)? Discursive strategies based on
soft convergence provide one response. Sarkozy was much more ready than
Hollande, for example, to embrace the ‘world movement’ as a legitimising device
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to justify domestic reform. President Hollande preferred to adapt a strategy of
constructed divergence to provide distance from the record of former President
Sarkozy, and, indirectly, from the models embraced by his predecessor.
Divergences
Two versions of a divergence hypothesis were presented in the introductory section:
the constructed (soft) and the material (hard). In our typology, ‘constructed divergence’
focuses on a speciﬁc type of cognitive or interactional mechanism whereby organisa-
tions and institutions construct themselves against perceived negative models.
Constructed divergence represents an ‘other’ as an adversary, identiﬁed with a
particular political ideology, policy or approach to service delivery. Hard divergence
is understood in terms of the persistence of deep underlying structures that pre-shape
institutional pathways. It is caused by the path-dependent development of institutions,
economies, legal orders or bounded governance concepts. In the ensuing section,
constructed divergence is elucidated by the discursive frames and policy choices
adopted by the Hollande–Ayrault administration in the ﬁeld of state reform.
Francois Hollande’s 2012 election campaign was based on his strategic political
positioning as being a ‘normal’ candidate and potential president, a style deliberately
adopted to be the counterpart of the ﬂamboyant Sarkozy. Anti-Sarkozyism was
a fundamental dynamic of the early Hollande period, a negative framing exempliﬁed,
in rather different ways, in the ﬁelds of state reform and decentralisation. To
understand the sense of drift that characterised the Hollande–Ayrault government
(May 2012–March 2014), one might proﬁtably borrow insights from the concept
of discursive institutionalism, as developed most fully by Schmidt (2008, 2010,
2011). Discourse is deﬁned by Schmidt (2011, p. 107) as ‘the interactive process of
conveying ideas’. In one article, Schmidt (2007) emphasised the importance for
policymakers of developing a legitimising discourse, especially in simple, majoritar-
ian democracies, such as France, that require persuasion and justiﬁcation in the
public sphere.24 When Schmidt (2007) describes politicians being ‘trapped in their
discourse’, she refers to a phenomenon close to Bourdieu’s (1980) concept of
hysteresis, which refers to the dependence of a social phenomenon on its past, as well
as its current environment. The case of Hollande exempliﬁes this poor ﬁt between
an existing repertoire and a changing ﬁeld.
In an earlier article, I argued that processes of state reform in France since the late
1980s might be observed through the lens of two rather different forms of justi-
ﬁcation that are labelled as public service and state productivity (Cole, 2010). The
public service narrative emphasised the need to ensure an efﬁcient state and an
effective public sector in order to defend a French social model; its proponents
looked to forms of contractualisation between public service providers, but did not
advocate a radical overhaul of existing processes, professional public sector norms or
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established bureaucratic hierarchies (Gaudin, 1999; Clark, 2000; Chevallier, 2003).
The state productivity narrative emphasised NPM, an emphasis on outputs, the
attainment of results, the private delivery of (some) public goods, the involvement of
private sector consultants and operators and a clear preference for budgetary (over
general administrative) actors (Bezes, 2009; Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre, 2011;
Epstein, 2013). Framing state reform in terms of public services corresponded best
to the Socialist periods in ofﬁce under Rocard (1988–1991) and Jospin (1997–2002),
while state productivity was embraced more openly from 2002 onwards with the
return of the Right, especially under Sarkozy. One of the paradoxes under Sarkozy
was that the state productivity narrative had great difﬁculty justifying the reforms
adopted, as deﬁcits and public debt escalated out of control as a consequence of the
general downturn (Raymond, 2012).
In terms of this framework, the Hollande/Ayrault government presented a clear
puzzle. There was no natural ideological sympathy with the prevalent themes of the
state productivity narrative as articulated by his predecessor Sarkozy. Ideologically
close to social democratic incrementalism, coordination and compromise, the natural
clients of the Socialist-led government were to be found among the public sector
workers and ofﬁcials whose support was vital for Hollande’s election. The Socialist
candidate mobilised the core symbols of public service: promising 60 000 new
recruits in the education sector, and undertaking symbolic side-payments that reveal
a natural sympathy to the interests of public servants (such as restoring sick pay from
Day 1 of an illness-related work absence) (Sawicki, 2013). Hollande was elected on
a programme of preserving the education, interior and justice budgets, but also on
the basis of a commitment to eradicate France’s structural deﬁcit by 2017 (Clift,
2012). The ﬁeld of state reform is symptomatic of the tensions between Socialist
traditions of public service on the one hand and the competitiveness agenda and
powerful state retrenchment incentives induced by economic austerity on the other.
The process of constructed divergence involves the identiﬁcation of an adversary
and a process of ‘othering’. State reform under Hollande started from the premise
that the previous programme under Sarkozy – the Révision générale des politiques
publiques (RGPP) – was a failure, as, indeed, was the whole Sarkozy enterprise. Yet
the Ayrault government could not afford to call into question many of the achieve-
ments of the RGPP. One of the Ayrault government’s ﬁrst actions was to commission a
report on the RGPP by the Financial, Social Affairs and General Affairs Inspectorates,
a report that highlighted a number of positive aspects: the reform of the territorial state
(RéATE), the re-organisation of local courts and tribunals (carte judiciare), the
creation of the Regional Health Agencies and the merging of the tax collection and
assessment bureaux into a uniﬁed service (Bondaz et al, 2012). The previous
government had set out to economise €15 billion with its state modernisation measures
and achieved almost €12 billion economies. The number of state employees had
declined by 5.4 per cent, of which 3 per cent were imputable to the RGPP. All in all,
503 measures were implemented from 2007 to 2012 with the label RGPP. But the
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report was also critical about the RGPP, especially in relation to the lack of
consultation and the almost exclusive budgetary concerns. The report recognised that
the RGPP had become associated with the process of not replacing ‘1 in 2’ staff taking
retirement, with a ﬁnancial, rather than an evaluation logic. And while the spin around
the RGPP had been all about joining up reform of the State and decentralisation, in
practice the dual processes of state territorial reform had been largely separate.25
The Hollande version of the state reform programme was entitled the Public Policy
Modernisation Programme (Modernisation de l’Action publique –MAP). There were
important symbolic (and some substantive) differences between the two processes of
state reform, the RGPP under Sarkozy and the MAP under Hollande. The Hollande
administration was, in some respects, more joined up with its approach to state
reform than its predecessor. Unlike the RGPP, the MAP encompasses not only state
ministries, but also local government, the welfare system and public agencies. The
MAP involves policy evaluations, rather than ﬁxed targets to be applied indiscrimi-
nately of sector (Doriac, 2013; Botella, 2013). Policy audits typically concern cross-
ministerial ﬁelds of policy (the ﬁelds of housing policy and handicapped people were
selected for the ﬁrst audits in December 2012) and take around 6 months. The audits
associated practitioners, local authorities and public service managers, as well as state
ofﬁcials. Unlike the NPM approach, targets would be determined at the end of a
process of negotiation, rather than determined in accordance with a budgetary
template. To succeed in its broad objectives, the MAP will need to be much harsher
than the RGPP. Given the political commitment to increase employment in
education, the police and the courts, the government will need to cut much deeper
into public service employment elsewhere. The new government demanded cuts of
2.5 per cent in staff numbers in the non-priority areas of public policy: all except
Education, the Police and Justice. One source estimated that there would need to be
8000 annual job losses in the Defence ministry, 2500 in Finance ministry and 3000
in the Ecology ministry (Paquier, 2013a).
One year after its creation, however, the MAP was barely visible as a cross-cutting
public policy process, and its pretension to provide a holistic approach to policy-
making was met with general scepticism in interviews.26 In relation to the territorial
dimension of the state’s action, the legacy 1 year was far from insigniﬁcant. The
second State Modernisation Interministerial committee (CIMAP), held on 17 July
2013, announced two potentially far-reaching reforms: one granting the regional
prefectures control for the ﬁrst time of budgets for all ﬁeld services under their
control; the second deﬁning stricter conditions under which central ministries could
issue circulars to their ﬁeld services at the local, departmental and regional levels
(CIMAP, 2013; Fargues, 2013). 27 But these rather technical ‘modernisation’ reforms
appeared marginal to traditional defenders of public services who equated the MAP
with state retrenchment.28 The Association of Rural Mayors spokesperson com-
plained, for example, that cut backs in state personnel working for one state agency,
the Atesat, would deprive communes of technical assistance in their areas of
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traditional concern such as planning roundabouts or public squares (Berberian,
2013). The local public sector was earmarked for 20 per cent of the €10 billion that
needed to be cut as part of the competitiveness pact (Paquier, 2013b); its contribution
to the pacte de responsabilité was likely to be even higher.
Comparing Hollande and Sarkozy suggests that robust political leadership is
required to drive reform that challenges institutional inertia; its chances of success
appear correlated to timescale and intensity (Elgie, 1993; Burnham, 2009; Bezes,
2010). Presidential power is most effective in France when there is active presidential
involvement in steering, as in the early RGPP under Sarkozy.29 By comparison, such
leadership was lacking in the case of Hollande, who remained one step removed from
both processes of state modernisation and decentralisation. Hollande was faithful to
his campaign commitment to introduce a new decentralisation reform (his Dijon
speech, February 2012), but was not strongly personally implicated in either process.
State reform and decentralisation under Hollande has been marked by institutional
confusion and the absence of a legitimising discourse for change. The nomination of
Maryse Lebranchu as the Minister for State Reform, Decentralisation and the Civil
Service was intended to present a more holistic approach to state modernisation than
under the previous Sarkozy-Fillon administration, by removing this ﬁeld from the
exclusive prerogative of the Budget ministry and its associated General Directorate
for State Modernisation (Direction générale de la modernisation de l’Etat – DGME).
The creation of the General Secretariat for the Modernisation of Public Policy
(Secrétariat Général de la Modernisation de l’Action Publique – SGMAP) was
presented as a political sign that the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce had taken back control of
the State Reform agenda from the budget division30 This institutional tinkering
illustrated the need never to lose from sight the bureau-shaping motivations of state
reform. One consequence of the lessening centrality of the budget division, however,
was to blur responsibility for state modernisation and to lessen its political saliency:
from being a synoptic reform under Sarkozy, the MAP drifted into insigniﬁcance.
‘Act 3’ of decentralisation was even more dissipated across rival bureaux, as well as
being shaped by the rigorous lobbying activities of the local government associations
and the activism of PS deputies and senators.31 These examples suggested an overall
lack of practical efﬁciency, more than an exemplar of joined-up government.
The process of constructed divergence was limited in time and ineffective in its
outcomes. The blurring of discourse made it much more difﬁcult for Hollande to
retain credibility for related initiatives such as the administrative simpliﬁcation (choc
de simpliﬁcation) announced in July 2013.
Hard divergence and institutional resilience: The case of decentralisation?
Does divergence best describe the evolution of the trajectories of (national and
territorial) governance in Western Europe? There has been a general trend across
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Europe towards decentralisation and new modes of multilevel governance (Keating,
1998; Loughlin et al, 2010; Piatonni, 2010). Various studies have focused on
divergence within the United Kingdom facilitated by the introduction of an asymme-
trical form of devolution (especially Greer, 2004). Diverging dynamics have also been
described, inter alia, in Belgium (de Visscher and Laborderie, 2013), Spain (Colino,
2013) and France (Pasquier, 2012). Rather than just constituting another variety of
convergence (towards a new regionalism, for example), such asymmetry can support a
divergence argument, insofar as the pathways of decentralisation and state reform are
shaped by contextually speciﬁc institutional, economic or ideational variables and
practices. Insofar as they exemplify path-dependent forms of governance, state and
decentralisation reforms might reinforce arguments based on national distinctiveness,
rather than describing a general trend. Our (necessarily partial) overview of French
decentralisation in 2014 reafﬁrms the importance of three types of domestic constraint:
binding normative and constitutional principles; the sub-optimal institutional outcomes
of three decades of layering; and the partisan logics of shared decision making.
Domestic normative constraints refer to the existing constitutional settlement, and,
more generally, the norms afﬁrmed in successive Acts and implementing decrees since
1982 (Marcou, 2011; Le Lidec, 2012b). The original sin of French decentralisation
relates to the tensions between two fundamental principles. The ﬁrst principle, central
to the 1982 reforms, is that decision-making responsibilities should be attributed to
speciﬁc ‘levels’ of sub-national authority, the ‘blocs de compétences’ provision. The
division of competencies between levels (communes and intercommunal syndicates,
departments, regions) might be likened to a quasi-federal arrangement with a clear
underpinning of the EU subsidiarity doctrine (Schondorf-Haubold, 2007). The second
principle, however, that of the ‘free administration of local authorities’, cuts across the
apparent clarity of the ﬁrst (see especiallyMarcou, 2011). All authorities should enjoy
the freedom of initiative to make policies in areas they deem important for their
constituents, the general competency clause. The constitution was amended in 2003 to
prevent any formal hierarchy of one local authority over another, the so-called absence
of tutelle provision, added to the constitution in order to provide a safeguard for the
communes and the communal bloc who feared being subsumed by more powerful
departments and regions. The ‘no hierarchy’ norm provides an incentive to agree
contractualised forms of relationship between local authorities and the State. Moreover,
it recalls, in the Jacobin tradition, that only the central State can have precedence over
speciﬁc local authorities. As a governance principle, the ‘no-hierarchy’ clause is a
recipe for stasis; in practice, the various sub-national authorities have overlapping
territorial jurisdictions and loosely deﬁned spheres of competence. No single authority
can impose its will on any other, or prevent a rival authority from adopting policies in
competition with its own (Chavrier, 2013).
French sub-national governance operates within the system of the millefeuille
institutionel, the colourful metaphor used to describe the many layers of local public
administration: the communes, inter-communal public corporations, departments,
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regions, city-wide authorities and special statute authorities that were given constitu-
tional recognition in the 2003 constitutional reform and conﬁrmed in the law of
16 December 2010. A steady process of institutional accretion has taken place.
The French constitution now recognises four levels of local authority within the
constitution: the commune (and by extension the communal bloc, including the
EPCI), the department, the region and those with a ‘special statute’ (Cole, 2006).
Recent decentralisation reforms – of 2003–2004, 2010 and 2013–2014 – have not
altered the basic, highly fragmented structure of French local government. ‘Who does
what’ might not be the most interesting question. French sub-national governance
rests upon a complex actor system, whereby policy is managed by plural actors with
overlapping responsibilities at several levels. Complex actor systems produce
interdependent relationships, rather than clear-cut transfers of responsibilities.
Network analyses are almost certainly required to capture the complexity of policy
processes (Cole and John, 2001). And yet what has been analysed elsewhere as the
system of competitive interdependency involves inﬂationary institutional layering,
whereby institutions maximise staff and ﬁnancial resources, and seek redress by
insisting on a favourable interpretation of legal norms.
Partisan and institutional logics complete the endogenous triptych. After its
victories in the 2008 municipal, 2010 regional and 2011 cantonal elections, the PS
ran a majority of large cities, almost two-thirds of départements, and all mainland
regional councils except Alsace. Building on this electoral success, the left ﬁnally
conquered the Senate in 2011, which immediately invested substantial resources
in and reﬂection upon local government reform (Brouard et al, 2013). Until Hollande’s
2012 election, this asymmetry complicated inter-governmental relations, as central
government was wary of transferring more competencies to the local or regional level.
Partisan competition had a clear impact on the outcomes of the 2004 reform; why
strengthen the regions if they were to be controlled by the opposition parties? A similar
calculation explained the refusal to engage in a far-reaching overhaul of local
government competencies in the 2010 Act (Cole, 2012). The partisan paradox
revealed its pertinence once again in 2013. The Ayrault government made the
calculation that the PS would retain control of most of the large cities governed by
the Socialists (at least Paris, Lyons, Lille and premier Ayrault’s own city of Nantes),
hence the decision to focus on strengthening large cities in the ﬁrst instance.32
These domestic-level variables were at least as important as exogenous arguments in
explaining the precise contours of the 2014 Law on the Modernisation of Territorial
Policy and the Cities (loi de Modernisation de l’action publique territoriale
et d’afﬁrmation des métropoles – henceforth MAPAM), the ﬁrst of three promised
as part of the Decentralisation ‘Act 3’ package.33 The MAPAM law was published on
28 January 2014. It contained a number of innovations (République Française, 2014).
Starting from the precept that not all categories of local or regional authorities face the
same substantive policy problems, the original bill contained provision for an
asymmetrical distribution of powers. The bill, published in April 2013, referred to the
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right to transfer competencies between local and regional authorities and to allow
a process of experimentation, whereby not all regions would exercise the same
responsibilities (Assemblée nationale, 2013). The precise distribution of policy
competencies would be determined on a region–by-region basis by negotiation in the
Regional Territorial Conferences (chaired by the regional Presidents); they would be
approved by a national-level High Council for the Territories (Haut conseil des
territoires). These regional conferences would have inﬂuence over the norms to be
implemented by local authorities, though the latter would not be forced to cooperate.34
In the ﬁnal law, the Regional Territorial Conferences were retained in a watered-down
form, but the High Council for the Territories was suppressed.35
The second key principle of the MAPAM law, corresponding to the logic of the
blocs de compétences, was that of the lead authority (chef de ﬁle). In his speech at the
Sorbonne on 4 October 2012, President Hollande announced that: ‘each ﬁeld of public
policy ought to be led by one local or regional authority, with powers to ﬁx the rules
and procedures under which this policy might be delegated to other local authorities’.36
The idea of a lead authority addressed the constitutional barrier to allowing any one
authority hierarchy over any other, the so-called absence of tutelle reinforced in the
2010 Act; the other local authorities would continue to exist (Chavrier, 2013). The
Regions were conﬁrmed in their role as strategic councils. They were recognised as
lead authority in training, transport, economic development, innovation, biodiversity,
sustainable development, climate change, air quality, energy and support for higher
education and research. They were expected to perform lead roles in the new Public
Investment Bank and were granted control over European structural funds. The
departments were strengthened in their role as service providers for the local welfare
state, for example, obtaining control of social care centres for handicapped people,
personal autonomy, social development and energy insecurity. Communes (and the
EPCI) were recognised as lead authorities in relation to mobility, the organisation of
local public services, physical environment and local development, the ecological
transition and sustainable mobility. The Territorial Governance Pacts would attempt to
harmonise the division of competencies between layers of local authority, to be
negotiated in each region (Gerbeau and Paquier, 2013).37
The main innovation of the 2014 MAPAM Act concerned the métropoles38
(République Française, 2014; Gerbeau, 2014). The law conferred a special statute for
Paris, Lyons and Marseilles (rather as an earlier law (known as PLM) had in the 1982
round of decentralisation laws).39 The MAPAM law granted a special statute to the
three largest cities (Paris, Lyons and Marseilles) and granted the status of métropoles
to nine other cities (Bordeaux, Grenoble, Lille, Nantes, Nice, Rennes, Rouen,
Strasbourg and Toulouse) with a further two (Brest and Montpellier) able to bid for
the coveted status at a later date. The existence of the métropoles enhances further the
principle of territorial differentiation by recognising speciﬁc metropolitan challenges.
But there were numerous points of inconsistency: the separate provisions for Paris,40
Lyons41 and Marseilles;42 the numerical threshold for obtaining the status of
Not saying, not doing
121© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
a métropole (lowered from 450 000 to 250 000 in the case of the Breton city of Brest,
for example, supported by the [Breton] minister Lebranchu); the precise policy
responsibilities of the métropoles, which vary according to place.43
Decentralisation Act 3 bears a number of similarities with Decentralisation Act
2 of 2003–2004. Both processes reasoned at an early stage in terms of territorial
differentiation and experimentation, but neither pushed this analysis to its logical
conclusion. Both played with the idea of territorial leadership by recognising lead
authorities, but stopped short of following the quasi-federal logic of allowing the
regions a general authority over the other layers of local government. Both sets of
reforms revealed the inﬂuence of the second chamber, the Senate, on the detailed
legislation that eventually emerged from the parliamentary process (see Le Lidec,
2009, for the fullest discussion of 2003–2004).44 At the time of writing, numerous
questions remained unanswered: would there be a move to vest genuine regulatory
powers on the regional level, as hinted by President Hollande in his 14 January press
conference? If so, why reintroduce the General Competency clause for the regions and
the departments in the 2014 MAPAM law? Would there be a reduction in the number
of regions, from 22 to 15 or fewer, as advocated in the 2009 Balladur report, and
evoked again in early 2014? Would the departments be suppressed? These questions
have been recurrent ones in the recent history of French decentralisation. One expert
interviewed in 2013 calculated that there were now 15 distinct regimes for governing
relations between central government and local and regional authorities, depending on
their size, location, level or degree of stand-alone ﬁscal capacity.45 The 2014
MAPAM reform provided no answers and, indeed, by creating the new métropoles,
increased the inﬂationary institutional layering that was identiﬁed in the Attali (2008)
and Gallois (2012) report as one of France’s structural weaknesses.
France’s Contingent Governance
The reconﬁguration of European states is a core tenet in the abundant academic
literature on governance (see recently Loughlin, 2009; Piatonni, 2010; Jessop, 2013;
Le Galès, 2013; Pasquier et al, 2013). French politics has often required conceptualis-
ing a coherent centre, a global référentiel, a sense of direction, of scalar hierarchy, of
equal treatment, of inalienable rights guaranteed by state acting in the general interest
(Cole, 2008). But the French polity has also mutated under the combined impact of
internal and external pressures for change. Complex legal orders and interdependent
relationships lay bare traditional beliefs about the supremacy of the state (Keating,
1998). Multi-level dynamics and the requirements of multi-actor coordination create
new challenges for actors vested with public authority (Wollmann et al, 2010). The
operation of the international political economy has produced metaphors of a hollow
state that go to the very heart of the French statist model. These material realities have
been extensively discussed and debated (especially in Cole, 2008).
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This discussion is necessary because neither convergence nor divergence make
sense in a purely national frame. Governance needs to be qualiﬁed, however. There
are dangers with attributing mechanical effects to movements such as Europeanisa-
tion, globalisation, or even decentralisation; these constructions are interpreted and
mediated in different ways in speciﬁc contexts, whether that context be organisa-
tional, sectoral or the form of the state. Policymaking takes place within a realm of
discourse, a system of ideas and representations that is comprehensible to the actors
involved (Bevir and Rhodes, 2002; Muller, 2005; Schmidt, 2008) and that informs
ways of knowing that vary according to places, countries, policy ﬁelds and historical
periods. Attempts to describe state reform or decentralisation in terms of overarching
covering laws or meta-narratives without reference to context are unlikely to be very
convincing.
The context is thus key to unlocking speciﬁc ways of knowing (Moses and
Knutsen, 2012). But how best to conceptualise context? The core choice to operate in
relation to France is an adjectival one: Ought governance to be qualiﬁed by the
adjective of contingency or boundedness? Bounded governance represents one
alternative; context is understood as an independent variable, the variable lourde
that translates external and internal pressures into outcomes that are consistent with
established institutions, interests and ideational frameworks. Bounded governance
borrows from Simon’s bounded rationality: agents act rationally, but their knowledge
is limited and they prefer to act upon what they know and understand, even if this
means accepting sub-optimal outcomes (Cole, 2007). As originally formulated by the
author, the central argument was that governance in France is bounded by
institutional structures and path dependencies, by collective action repertoires and
domestic interest structures, by the dynamics of policy sectors, above all by the
overarching ideational and discursive contexts within which sense-making occurs
(Cole, 2007). The metaphor of bounded governance emphasises above all the
pertinence of hard divergence modes of reasoning.
While national contexts matter, they must not be confused with a static version
of national purpose, however, as the metaphor of boundedness might imply.
Arguments based mainly on national, institutional or cultural distinctiveness
cannot easily cope with political and policy change. French responses to change are
embedded in precise contexts, but they are not literally pre-shaped. The French
polity has adapted and will continue to adapt to processes of domestic and external
change and slowly transform itself in the process. Hence the preference for the
concept of contingent governance, where context is held to be important, but
which operates as an intervening variable that acknowledges human agency. Our
preferred approach acknowledges the contribution of interpretative and discursive
approaches (how actors frame and justify change), as well as new institutional
perspectives (especially how change is ﬁltered by institutions, and how decisions can
tie-in future trajectories) and praxeology (how practice and practical interactions
affect outcomes) (Tilly, 2001; Bevir and Rhodes, 2002; Radaelli, 2005; Schmidt,
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2010; Bueger, 2013). Patterns of multi-level, national and sub-national governance
are subject to sets of conditions that are contingent upon variable environmental,
cognitive and interactional contexts.
The preferred adjectival choice to qualify governance is that of contingency.
A contingent governance approach captures best our understanding of the Politics
of Austerity in Hollande’s France. Processes of hard and soft convergence and
divergence operate in distinctive ways depending on whether formal outputs, informal
outcomes, political discourses or institutional innovations are considered. The four
positions identiﬁed in our typology are more (soft) or less (hard) receptive to human
agency. Hard convergence and divergence as results are best explained by material
macro-level variables (economic indicators, institutional pathways and legal orders),
which create tensions, sometimes evolve in opposing directions and require individual
or collective-level interventions. ‘Soft’ convergence and divergence as mechanisms
allow more room for human agency, speciﬁcally strategic choices and forms of
discursive legitimisation, though they are ultimately bounded by harder material
constraints. The following conclusions demonstrate our preferred explanations for the
cases covered in this article, but, as Tilly (2001, p. 38) argues, law-like generalisations
extrapolated from even complex contexts are likely to be of limited utility (Table 2).
The article has provided strong arguments to support a hard convergence thesis.
The ﬁnancial crisis has provided evidence of some recentralisation of decentralisa-
tion, whereby the latest phase of EU integration has forced central governments
in most instances to exercise a tighter supervision over local and regional govern-
ment expenditures. Membership of the Eurozone creates a permanent pressure not
to diverge that is likely to intensify as the zone becomes increasingly integrated.
Europeanisation has produced a lessening of divergence in legal systems and in the
provenance of much public policy (Ladrech, 2010). In the French case, it is too early
to judge the impact of these pressures in the ﬁeld of our investigation: state
modernisation and decentralisation. In comparison with counterparts elsewhere in
Europe, there has been no major calling into question of territorial equilibriums as
a result of downgrading of local or regional authorities, as has occurred notably in
Spain (Colino, 2013). The forces driving hard convergence have a differential impact
depending, somewhat, on the size and resources of an individual member-state:
France is in a stronger position, for example, than Spain (on an account of the interest
rate spreads) or Belgium (a small divided country) to resist unwelcome inﬂuences
from European policy. But this is a matter of degree. France is closely monitored
by European authorities, international organisations and the markets and cannot
determine its policy in a vacuum. Hard convergence arguments are much less
convincing in terms of institutions; even common trends such as NPM appear shaped
more by domestic traditions than by a genuine cross-national template. On balance,
however, the forces identiﬁed as those of hard convergence are gaining ground.
To reason in terms of hard divergence makes sense mainly insofar as it refers to the
capacity of existing institutional conﬁgurations to deﬁne the parameters and limits of
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Table 2: States of convergence and causal mechanisms
State of
convergence
Drivers Causal mechanisms Results (Hollande)
Hard
convergence
Europeanisation as conditionality
Empirical referents (for example, instruments)
Economic crisis
Intrusive monitoring
Sanctions for non-
compliance
Delayed response – but gaining ground
Soft
convergence
Institutional Isomorphism
Interaction (policy learning)
Cognition (benchmarking)
Logics of emulation
Spillover from hard
convergence
Diffusion
Stronger under Sarkozy than Hollande
Soft divergence Constructed divergence Othering Cognitive dissonance
Weak legitimising discourse
Hard
divergence
Institutional pathways, bounded governance, party and
interest structures
Logics of appropriateness
Path dependency
Zero sum interactions
Powerful in framing Decentralisation Act 3, but
ultimately losing ground
N
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change. This conclusion does not imply that the French model of territorial relations
is radically different from others or that the direction of change is necessarily
divergent. But it does lead us to conclude that the pressures producing hard or soft
convergence are mediated by domestic party structures, interests and existing
institutional conﬁgurations. Heavy domestic variables might be interpreted in part
as the incremental adjustments of past bargains that are given legal-constitutional
status (for example, in the constitutional reform of 2003 which prevented hierarchy
of local authorities). Hard divergence is conﬁrmed in key senses by the persistence of
national administrative pathways (John and Cole, 2000). Domestic state and
institutional structures, party systems and the political rules of the game still make
sense nationally, leading Schmidt (2006) to diagnose a dangerous gap between
(national) political competition and (European) policy formulation. As discussed
above, the 2014 decentralisation reform demonstrates clearly that domestic variables
remain a formidable source of resistance to change. The persistence of embedded
institutional interests tends to produce satisﬁcing forms of arrangement. The work
undertaken by Le Lidec (2007, 2012a, b) in particular allows us to make sense of the
weight of established institutions, interests and sequences in determining the
pathways of territorial reform. On balance, however, the forces of hard divergence
are losing ground, as economic, epistemic and European pressures continually
challenge the forces of institutional inertia.
Hard mechanisms (whether of convergence or divergence) mainly involve
structural-based explanations: they are less amenable to human agency than either
soft convergence or divergence. Our investigation demonstrated limited evidence of
soft convergence, at least during the ﬁrst 24 months of the Hollande presidency. In
practice, there was not much evidence of voluntary benchmarking. The dynamic of
soft convergence appeared stronger under Sarkozy than Hollande, in the form of
a more explicit espousal of the language of NPM and a closer connection between
discourse and practice. What was labelled as soft or constructed divergence was
pursued far more vigorously by the Hollande administration, deﬁned above all in
terms of reacting against the Sarkozy period (the abandoning of the RGPP, the repeal
of core aspects of the December 2010 territorial reform). The ﬁrst 2 years
demonstrated the limits of the anti-Sarkozy method; framing state reform in negative
terms had the major disadvantage, in Schmidt’s terminology, of preventing the
emergence of a coherent legitimising discourse. The Hollande–Ayrault administra-
tion was undermined by its absence of a legitimising discourse for change, by its lack
of internal cohesion and by the weight of rival institutional lobbies. Hollande’s
discursive shifts were the equivalent of the couacs46 that delighted critical
commentators. They were interpreted as an inability to pursue a consistent line and
to persuade the electorate of its necessity. Schmidt (2008, p. 305) urges us to taking
seriously ‘what actors say and do’; by extension, due consideration ought to be given
to what they do not say and do not do. In the ﬁeld of State Modernisation, the
message was inaudible; in the case of decentralisation, the original coherent
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proposals were salami sliced. There was an eminently practical consequence of the
lack of a consistent discourse: the government deprived itself of a legitimising device
to tie in actors to shared visions. The limitations of discursive approaches must be
acknowledged in some respects, but this discussion demonstrates their power in
terms of deﬁning the conditions for the exercise of discursive institutionalism.
Discursive institutionalism is not a simple description of institutionalisation, but
a challenge in relation to how to embed a paradigm or interpretive frame within an
institution. Sarkozy came closer to achieving this mix than Hollande.
Notes
1 The research project (Territorial Governance in Western Europe: Between Convergence and Capacity)
was supported by the Leverhulme Trust’s International Network programme (IN-2012–109, 2012–2015).
I am grateful to the Trust for its support. I am also grateful to the Collegium de Lyon, which provided
additional support, and to Cardiff University for its University Research Fellowship award in 2013–2014.
Twenty-nine interviews were carried out in Paris and in the French region of Brittany from July to
September 2013. The article also draws on earlier interviews (1994–1996, 2001–2003, 2004–2005,
2006–2007, 2010) carried out as part of projects funded by the ESRC, the AHRC, the British Academy
and the Fondation de France. I thank all of these agencies for their support.
2 I am indebted to Arthur Benz who provided valuable commentary in relation to this section.
3 The role of Eurostat was emphasised in several interviews, especially in Belgium in early 2014.
4 Le Lidec (2011a) emphasises the importance of sequential timing. In his interpretation, the sequence –
ﬁnancial, political, administrative – can explain the character of French decentralisation reforms,
initially interpreted in terms of the consolidation of the grands élus. Such sequencing is compatible
with the contingent governance approach presented here. An alternative explanation might emphasise
the differential logics present even in 1982–1986 (removing obstacles in the way of the grands élus, but
also defence of the départements, and support for forms of regional capacity and identity building) and
might stress the iterative nature of change, not locked into one deﬁnitive mode of regulation.
5 Interviews were carried out mainly in central government (in 2005 and 2010) and in the French
region of Brittany (in the summer of 2013). As Bretons performed a key role in the Hollande
administration, especially in this sphere of policy action, Brittany was the perfect place to be for
3 months just before the ‘Red Beret’ movement erupted. Interviews are also scheduled in Lyon in
May–June 2014.
6 The case, for instance, for the ‘low-proﬁle instruments’ analysed by Bezes (2007) to limit the growth of
civil service wages in France, or the use of non-indexation to control salaries in the UK public sector
under Cameron.
7 Twenty-ﬁve interviews were carried out in the Spanish region of Andalucía in October–November
2013 as part of the Leverhulme Trust project.
8 This conclusion was shared in interviews in the Wallon Regional Council and the Belgian central bank
in January–February 2014, as part of the 25 interviews carried out in Belgium as part of the Leverhulme
Trust project.
9 This point was acknowledged in interviews with the MEDEF, August 2013.
10 Qualiﬁed majority voting (QMV) is the basic principle for determining European Union policy
decisions, except in those limited areas where the rule of unanimity still prevails. Votes for each
country are weighted according to population. RQMV implies that a recommendation or a proposal of
the Commission is considered adopted in the Council unless a qualiﬁed majority of Member States
votes against it. Under the reverse QMV procedure, a qualiﬁed majority will need to be mobilised to
Not saying, not doing
127© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
prevent automatic penalties in the case of not respecting the revised Stability Pact criteria. Larger
countries are better placed than smaller ones.
11 The ‘Six Pack’ refers to ﬁve regulations and one directive adopted as part of the reform of the EU’s
ﬁscal governance and the SGP in 2011. The many measures adopted included: country-speciﬁc
medium-term objectives for deﬁcit and debt reduction; the requirement that general government
deﬁcits and public debt must not exceed 3 per cent and 60 per cent of GDP, respectively, or at least
diminish sufﬁciently towards the 60 per cent threshold. The Six Pack made it easier to apply the
Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure to Member States having breached either the deﬁcit or the debt criterion.
Financial sanctions for non-compliance might eventually reach 0.5 per cent of GDP. The Six Pack was
closely associated with– but separate from – the European semester (granting the EU commission much
greater oversight into national budgets) and the TSGG, giving a constitutional status to the golden rule
of virtually balanced budgets. For details, see ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁnance/articles/governance/
2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm, accessed 3 March 2014.
12 This theme was stressed in interviews with the Association des régions de France (ARF)(2010), the
Association des départements de France (ADF)(2013) and the Association des communautés de France
(AcuF)(2013)
13 Interviews ARF (2010); ACuF (2013); ADF (2013).
14 Interviews in the Brittany regional council, July and August 2013.
15 Interviews AcuF (2013); Rennes métropole (2013).
16 Several interviews were carried out with public ﬁnance specialists and actors. All agreed that formal
ﬁscal autonomy had been greatly reduced for the regions and departments. There was less agreement
about how well local and regional authorities would adapt. One senior public ﬁnance ofﬁcial working
for an EPCI was of the opinion that past ﬁnancial largesse would easily allow the councils to absorb
this cut. Ofﬁcials working for the departments and the regions were far less sanguine.
17 Interview, ADF, September 2013.
18 The EPCI were given a new share of the two important taxes – on residents and land –while the regions
and departments lost their share of these dynamic taxes.
19 The expression was used repeatedly in interviews in the State Reform directorate (DGME) in 2010.
20 ‘Aujourd’hui à Bercy c’est presque un dogme, dès qu’un poste se libère on fait appel à un cabinet de
consultants, un chasseur de tête, on ne cherche pas dans la structure’. Interview, Finance ministry,
2010.
21 President Sarkozy made the commitment to abolish the Classement de sortie de l’ENA, but this was
abandoned in one of the last acts of the Fillon government.
22 Interviewees in the DGME in 2010 celebrated a ‘French-style new public management’. In an earlier
interview in the Finance ministry in 2005, one interlocutor clearly identiﬁed the new budgetary policy
in terms of opportunities: ‘La gestion publique est dominée en France par la gestion de la régularité.
L’émergence et le développement d’une culture de la performance au travers des lois organiques et des
démarches d’objectif devraient faire basculer l’approche de la gestion publique plus vers la question
des performances et des résultats que dans la question de la régularité …. Il faut absolument faire
dominer l’approche des performances sur l’approche des régularités’.
23 Interview evidence (in the Financial Division) from the Brittany region in 2013 suggested that the
regional council had adopted the methodology of the 2001 budgetary law (LOLF) in its own internal
budgetary processes.
24 Schmidt distinguishes between simple (majoritarian) and compound (consensual) polities.
25 Evidence to this effect is provided in Cole (2012).
26 Local and regional government actors interviewed were, in general, sceptical about the link between
the MAP and the local government reforms. One PS deputy, rapporteur of the ﬁrst decentralisation bill
in the National Assembly, argued that Minister Lebranchu had been unable to link the two processes.
27 State actors interviewed in September 2013 conﬁrmed that the regional State would be given a further
boost by these measures, which demonstrated continuity with territorial state reform under Sarkozy.
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But doubts were expressed within one regional prefecture about the extent of the regional prefect’s
control over the budgets of the other state services: C’est un peu décevant. La décision numéro 30 du
CIMAP, dit que c’est le préfet de région qui est RBop pour tous les services classés sous son autorité.
C’est sous son autorité et c’est lui qui décide. C’est l’évolution logique de la remonte vers le plan
régional. Mais la décision 31 a un contenu très décevant. J’ai demandé la fongibilité, encadrée
et contrôlée, de certains crédits et de certaines masses de postes pour que le préfet de région puisse
vraiment, là où il a besoin, affecter des personnels, affecter des crédits. Ça a été refusé catégoriquement.
28 A theme that emerged in several interviews in Brittany in summer 2013.
29 ‘Il y a eu un changement de président de la république, il a voulu afﬁrmer de manière forte ses
orientations sur l’administration: on ne remplace pas un emploi sur 2. Tout d’un coup dans ce ministère
il y a eu un changement brutal, les français ont élu de manière forte un nouveau président de la
République qui veut imposer un nouveau rythme, ça s’est fait immédiatement. Si il n’y avait pas eu un
acte politique majeur, ca n’aurait peut être pas eu lieu. Ça c’est l’aspect positif’. Interview French
Finance Ministry 2011.
30 The greater involvement of Matignon and distance of the Elysée was conﬁrmed in several interviews.
31 According to one source very close to the discussions, the decision to split the original proposals into
three came about as the result of ‘a discussion between Ayrault, Lebranchu and the chair of the legislation
committee in the Senate, who insisted that the text be cut into three to allow time for proper scrutiny’.
32 This interpretation was provided in several interviews, especially with the rapporteur of the MAPAM law.
33 The original plan had been to introduce one overarching reform that would have addressed the problems
of multiple structures, overlapping competencies and the control of public ﬁnances. Faced with powerful,
if contradictory, forces, however, Minister Lebranchu announced that the government would introduce
three separate bills: the ﬁrst one on city governments; the second on the clariﬁcation of competencies
between the 22 regions and 101 departments; and ﬁnally in relation to the ‘communal bloc’.
34 Local authorities refusing to cooperate would face ﬁnancial penalties of up to 30 per cent.
35 More than anything else, this reﬂected the continuing inﬂuence of the Senate, which had steadfastly
refused the High Council in the name of defending the principle of free administration. Interviews with
UMP and PS politicians converged on this point (July–September 2013). PS Senator J.P.Sueur
conﬁrmed this interpretation in his opening remarks to the GRALE colloquium on 30 ans de la fonction
publique territoriale, French Senate, 31 January 2014.
36 ‘A chaque grande politique correspondrait une seule autorité qui ﬁxerait les modalités et l’action qui
peut être déléguée à d’ autres collectivités’. Cited in ‘Ce qu’attendent les territoires’ 15 January 2013,
ActeursPublic.com, accessed 8 April 2013.
37 The issue area of tourism was pulled between the regions and the departments. In an interview, one pro-
regionalist deputy claimed to have lobbied hard for tourism to remain a general competency, rather than
granting the responsibility to the departments, the provision that initially emerged from the Senate’s
ﬁrst reading.
38 I have left métropoles in the French.
39 For one sceptic, the ﬁrst law was ‘not a decentralisation law but a law on cities’.
40 One of the key aspects of the MAPAM law was the creation of the Greater Paris Council, an
Intercommunal Public Corporation (Établissement public de coopération intercommunale – EPCI)
with its own taxation powers. It will bring together the city of Paris, all communes in the three
departments of the small Paris belt (Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne), along with
some communes in the larger Ile-de-France region. It will exercise the classic functions of an urban
community: planning, land use, social housing, economic, social and cultural development, along with
some environmental and energy responsibilities. It is expected to come into existence on 1 January
2016. The Greater Paris council will take over certain functions from existing EPCI. Unlike in Lyons,
the existing departments will continue to exist.
41 In Lyon, the proposed métropole is by far the most integrated, with the city of Lyon taking over social
policy responsibilities from the Rhône-Alpes department.
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42 In Marseilles, there is very serious opposition from nearly all local players to the proposed métropole,
which will merge Marseilles city with a number of outlying urban centres.
43 The métropoles will be strengthened with respect to the classic intercommunal corporations. They will
be the lead players in the structure plans (schéma de cohérence territoriale) within their boundaries.
They are given stronger powers in relation to land use around train stations. Their powers in relation to
housing are greater than a non-metropolitan EPCI, notably in the ﬁeld of social housing. The
métropoles might take over some responsibilities exercised by the departments if contractual
agreements are concluded between the two (for example, in the ﬁeld of assistance for deprived young
people and housing grants). They might also take over some services currently delivered by the
regions. The métropole is recognised as the lead authority in relation to local and regional government
competencies that are delivered within the city boundaries
44 Interviews undertaken by the author in 2013 conﬁrmed the strength of the Senate’s opposition to initial
proposals emerging from the National Assembly.
45 Interview with Ressources consultants, with an expert in local public ﬁnance.
46 Literally, the false notes in an orchestra.
References
ADF – Association des départements de France (2013) Interview with Author.
AcuF – Association des communautés de France (2013) Interview with Author.
ARF – Association des régions de France (2010) Interview with Author.
Assemblée nationale (2013) Projet de loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’afﬁrma-
tion des métropoles. Paris, France: Assemblée nationale, 19 July.
Attali, J. (2008) Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française: 300 décisions
pour changer la France. Paris, France: La documentation française.
Barone, S. (ed.) (2011) Les Politiques régionales en France. Paris, France: la Découverte.
Bennett, C. (1991) What is policy convergence and what causes it? British Journal of Political Science
21(2): 215–233.
Benz, A. (2007) Inter-regional competition in co-operative federalism: New modes of multi-level
governance in Germany. Regional and Federal Studies 17(4): 421–436.
Berberian, V. (2013) Non au déplacement de l’autorité de l’État vers les régions. 27 March,
Acteurspublics.com, accessed 10 April 2013.
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. (2002) Interpretive theory. In: D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and
Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 131–152.
Bezes, P. and Le Lidec, P. (2010) L’hybridation du modèle territorial français. Revue Française
d’Administration Publique 136: 919–942.
Bezes, P. (2007) The hidden politics of administrative reform: Cutting French civil service wages with
a low-proﬁle instrument. Governance 20(1): 23–56.
Bezes, P. (2009) Réinventer l’Etat. Les réformes de l’administration française. Paris, France: Presses
Universitaires de France.
Bezes, P. (2010) Morphologie de la Révision générale des politiques publiques. Une mise en perspective
historique et comparative. Revue française d’administration publique 134: 769–796.
Biland, E. (2012) La fonction publique territoriale. Paris, France: la Découverte.
Bolleyer, N. and Radaelli, C. (2009) Has Europeanization gone too far? Comparative European Politics
7(3): 384–395.
Bondaz, M. et al (2012) Bilan de la RGPP et conditions de reussite d’une nouvelle politique de reforme de
l’État. Paris, France: Premier ministre, p. 75.
Borraz, O. (2007) Governing standards: The rise of standardisation processes in France and the EU.
Governance 20(1): 57–84.
Cole
130 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
Botella, B. (2012) L’Etat n’a pas été pingre avec les collectivités sur la période de 2003–2011. 19 October,
Acteurspublics.com, accessed 31 March 2013.
Botella, B. (2013) Les premières décisions issues des évaluations. 17 July, Acteurspublics.com, accessed
22 July 2013.
Bouquet, J.-P. (2013) Etat des lieux des effectifs de la fonction publique territoriale. Paris, France: CSFPT.
Bourdieu, P. (1980) Le sens pratique. Paris, France: Les Éditions de Minuit.
Brouard, S., Costa, O. and Kerrouche, E. (2013) The ‘new’ French parliament: Changes and continuities.
In: A. Cole, S. Meunier and V. Tiberj (eds.) Developments in French Politics 5. Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 35–52.
Bueger, C. (2013) Pathways to practice: Praxiography and international politics. European Political
Science Review, ﬁrst view, 17 October 1–24.
Burnham, J. (2009) Politicians, bureaucrats and leadership in organisations: Lessons from Regional
planning in France. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chavrier, G. (2013) Le chef de ﬁle n’a absolument aucun pouvoir de contrainte. 5 July, La gazette.fr,
accessed 22 July 2013.
Chevallier, J. (2003) Le Service Public. Paris, France: Presses universitaires de France.
Clark, D. (2000) Public service reform: A comparative west European perspective.West European Politics
23(3): 25–44.
Clift, B. (2012) Les politiques économiques sous Sarkozy. Un patriotisme économique néolibéral? In: J. de
Maillard and Y. Surel (eds.) Les politiques publiques sous Sarkozy. Paris, France: Presses de Sciences
Po, pp. 299–320.
Cole, A. (2006) Beyond Devolution and Decentralisation. Building Regional Capacity in Wales and
Brittany. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Cole, A. (2008) Governing and Governance in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cole, A. (2007) Governing France. Inaugural lecture, Vincent Wright chair, Sciences Po, Paris, 18 March,
p. 24.
Cole, A. (2010) State reform in France: From public service to public management? Perspectives on
European Politics and Society 11(4): 343–357.
Cole, A. (2011) Prefects in search of a role in a Europeanised France. Journal of Public Policy 31(3):
385–407.
Cole, A. (2012) The French state and its territories. Public Administration 90(2): 335–350.
Cole, A. and Drake, H. (2000) The Europeanization of the French polity: Continuity, change and
adaptation. Journal of European Public Policy 7(1): 26–43.
Cole, A. and Eymeri-Douzans, J.-M. (2010) Administrative reforms and mergers in Europe: Research
questions and empirical challenges. International Review of Administrative Sciences 76(3): 395–406.
Cole, A. and John, P. (2001) Local Governance in England and France. London: Routledge.
Cole, A. and Pasquier, R. (2012) The impact of European integration on centre/periphery relations:
Comparing France and the United Kingdom. Politique européenne 36: 160–182.
Colino, C. (2013) The state of autonomies between the economic crisis and enduring nationalist tensions.
In: A. Botti and B.N. Field (eds.) Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain: From Zapatero to Rajoy.
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Comité interministériel pour la modernisation de l’action publique (CIMAP) (2013) Relevé de décisions.
Paris: Premier Ministre, 17 July.
Council of the European Union (2013) Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on France’s 2013
national reform programme and delivering a Council opinion on France’s stability programme for
2012–2017. 10635/1/13 REV 1, Brussels, 19 June, p. 15.
Cour des comptes (2013) L’Organisation territoriale de l’État. Paris, France: Cour des comptes.
Cour des comptes (2014) Rapport public annuel 2014. Paris, France: Cour des comptes.
de Visscher, C. and Laborderie, V. (2013) Belgique: Stop ou encore? Entre fédéralisme, confédéralisme et
séparatisme. Politique étrangère 4: 23–35.
Not saying, not doing
131© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
Direction Générale des collectivités locales (DGCL) (2013) Les chiffres-clés des collectivités locales.
Paris, France: Interior Ministry.
Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000) Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary
policy-making. Governance 13(1): 5–24.
Doriac, M. (2013) Modernisation de l’action publique: Marylise Lebranchu demande l’avis des agents.
2 March, LaGazette.fr, accessed 10 April 2013.
Dosière, R. (2012) L’Etat au régime. Paris, France: Seuil.
Duperon, O. (ed.) (2011) Les services publics locaux et la concurrence. Paris, France: L’Harmattan.
Dupuy, C. and Pollard, J. (2014) A dethroned king? The limits of state infrastructural power in France.
Public Administration, (ﬁrst view).
Dyson, K. (2014) Saints and Sinners. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Elgie, R. (1993) The French Prime Minister. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Epstein, R. (2006) Des contractualisations territoriales aux appels à projets. In: J.-C. Nemery (ed.)
Les Pôles de compétitivité dans le système français et européen. Paris, France: L’Harmattan,
pp. 81–90.
Epstein, R. (2013) La rénovation urbaine: Démolition-reconstruction de l’Etat. Paris, France: Presses de
Sciences Po.
Esping-Anderson, G. (2013) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. London: Wiley.
Evans, M. and Davies, J. (1999) Understanding policy transfer: A multi-level, multi-disciplinary
perspective. Public Administration 77(2): 361–385.
European Commission (2013) Final Recommendation for a Council Recommendation with a view to
bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deﬁcit in France. COM (2013) 384
Brussels, 29 May.
European Commission (2014) La Commission conclut les bilans approfondis visant à détecter les
déséquilibres macroéconomiques et à évaluer les progrès de l’assainissement budgétaire. Bruxelles.
IP/14/216. 5 March.
Eymeri-Douzans, J.-M. and Pierre, J. (eds.) (2011) Administrative Reforms and Democratic Governance.
London: Routledge.
Eymeri-Douzans, J.-M. (2013) Administrative reforms. Is France within the world movement? In: J.-M.
Eymeri-Douzans and G. Bouckaert (eds.) La France et ses Administrations. Un état des savoirs.
Bruxelles, Belgium: Bruylant, pp. 499–521.
Fargues, L. (2013) Les préfets mettent la main sur les budgets régionaux. Acteurspublics.com, 17 July
2013, accessed 22 July 2013.
Finance Ministry (2005) Interview with Author.
Finance Ministry (2010) Interview with Author.
Finance Ministry (2011) Interview with Author.
Gallois, L. (2012) Rapport au Premier ministre: Pacte pour la Competitivité de l’industrie française. Paris,
France: Premier ministre.
Gaudin, J.-P. (1999) Gouverner par Contrat. L’Action publique en question. Paris, France: Presses de
Sciences Po.
Gerbeau, D. (2014) Les 9 principales dispositions de la loi « métropoles » dans le détail. 30 January,
LaGazette.fr, accessed 3 February 2014.
Gerbeau, D. and Paquier, J. (2013) MAP: L’Etat local est-il en voie de disparition? 18 March, LaGazette.fr,
accessed 31 March 2013.
Gervais, J. (2010) Merging to survive? Institutional legitimacy and material considerations in the light of
the reorganization of corps within the French civil service. International Review of Administrative
Sciences 76(3): 425–441.
Graziano, P. and Vink, M. (eds.) (2007) Europeanization: New Research Agendas. Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Greer, S.L. (2004) Territorial Politics and Health Policy. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
Cole
132 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
Guengant, A. (2012) Effets redistributifs et péréquateurs anticipés de la réforme de la taxe professionnelle.
In: S. Regourd, J. Carles and D. Guignard (eds.) Réformes et mutations des collectivités territoriales.
Paris, France: Harmattan, pp. 173–185.
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (eds.) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Competitiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hertzog, R. (2010) Collectivités territoriales: La réforme sans l’argent, impossible ou indispensable? In:
J.-C. Nemery (ed.) Quelles Perspectives pour la Réforme territoriale. Paris, France: Harmattan,
pp. 91–106.
Holzinger, K., Jörgens, H. and Knill, C. (2007) Transfer, Diffusion und Konvergenz von Politiken.
Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Hood, C. (1998) The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon.
International Monetary Fund (2013) IMF Executive Board Concludes 2013 Article IV Consultation with
France, Press Release No. 13/295, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13295.htm, accessed
19 September 2013.
Jessop, R. (2013) L’imaginaire économique et l’économie politique des échelles. In: R. Pasquier,
V. Simoulin and J. Weisbein (eds.) La Gouvernance territoriale. Pratiques, discours et théories. Paris,
France: LGDJ, pp. 69–96.
John, P. and Cole, A. (2000) When do countries, sectors and localities matter? Comparative Political
Studies 33(2): 248–268.
Keating, M., Loughlin, J. and Deschouwer, K. (2003) Culture, Institutions and Regional Development:
A Study of Eight European Regions. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Keating, M. (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political
Change. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Kerr, C. (1983) The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity? Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, p. 3.
Knill, C. (2005) Introduction: Cross-national policy convergence: Concepts, approaches and explanatory
factors. Journal of European Public Policy 12(5): 764–774.
Kuhlmann, S. (2010) New public management for the classical continental European administration:
Modernisation at the local level in Germany, France and Italy. Public Administration 88(4): 1116–1130.
Ladrech, R. (2010) Europeanisation and National Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Laignel, A. and Guené, C. (2013) Les ﬁnances des collectivités locales en 2013. État des lieux. Paris,
France: l’Observatoire des Finances Locales.
Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P. (eds.) (2004) Gouverner par les instruments. Paris, France: Presses de
Sciences Po.
Lascoumes, P. and Le Galès, P. (2012) Sociologie de l’action publique. Paris: Armand Colin.
Le Galès, P. (2001) Urban governance and policy networks: On the urban political boundedness of policy
networks. A French case study. Public Administration 79(1): 167–184.
Le Galès, P. (2002) European Cities: Social Conﬂicts and Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Le Galès, P. (2013) La gouvernance territoriale sous pression de la crise et de la restructuration de l’État.
In: R. Pasquier, V. Simoulin and J. Weisbein (eds.) La Gouvernance territoriale. Pratiques, discours et
théories. Paris, France: LGDJ, pp. 289–300.
Le Lidec, P. (2007) Le jeu du compromis. L’État et les collectivités territoriales dans la decentralisation en
France. Revue française d’administration publique (121–122): 111–130.
Le Lidec, P. (2009) Réformer sous contrainte d’injonction contradictoire. L’exemple du Comité Balladur
sur la réforme des collectivités locales. Revue Française d’Administration Publique 131(3): 477–496.
Le Lidec, P. (2011a) Décentralisation, structure du ﬁnancement et jeux de transferts de l’impopularité en
France. In: P. Bezes and A. Sine (eds.)Gouverner (par) les ﬁnances publiques. Paris, France: Presses de
Sciences Po, pp. 149–192.
Le Lidec, P. (2011b) Décentralisation. In: R. Pasquier, S. Guigner and A. Cole (eds.) Dictionnaire des
politiques territoriales. Paris, France: Presses de sciences po, pp. 127–133.
Not saying, not doing
133© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
Le Lidec, P. (2012a) La réforme des collectivités territoriales sous Sarkozy. Entre (mise en scène du)
volontarisme et incrémentalisme. In: J. de Maillard and Y. Surel (eds.) Les politiques publiques sous
Sarkozy. Paris, France: Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 189–210.
Le Lidec, P. (2012b) Decentralisation and territorial reforms in France: How constitutional constraints
impact strategies for reform. In: A. Benz and F. Knüpling (eds.) Changing Federal Constitutions.
Opladen, Germany: Verlag Barbara Budrich, pp. 249–267.
Le Monde (2013) Comment réduire le déﬁcit des collectivités locales. 21 February.
Loughlin, J., Hendriks, F. and Lidstrom, A. (eds.) (2010) A Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Loughlin, J. (2009) The ‘hybrid’ state: Reconﬁguring territorial governance in Western Europe.
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10(1): 51–68.
Marcou, G. (2011) Clause générale de compétence. In: R. Pasquier, S. Guigner and A. Cole (eds.)
Dictionnaire des politiques territoriales. Paris, France: Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 57–62.
Marois, B. (2013) La dépense publique en France: état des lieux et comparaison. Les Echos 19 March.
Moses, J. and Knutsen, T. (2012) Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political
Research. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Muller, P. (2005) Esquisse d’une théorie du changement dans l’action publique. Structures, acteurs
et cadres cognitifs. Revue française de science politique 55(1): 155–187.
Négrier, E. (2011) Échelles d’action publique. In: R. Pasquier, S. Guigner and A. Cole (eds.) Dictionnaire
des politiques territoriales. Paris, France: Presses de sciences po, pp. 195–200.
Nunes, E. (2013) Collectivités locales: le poids croissant des temps partiels. Le Monde 4 March.
Page, E. (2000) Future governance and the literature on policy transfer and lesson drawing. Paper presented
to the ESRC Future Governance Programme Workshop on Policy Transfer, London: Britannia House.
Paquier, J. (2013a) Après la RGPP, vous allez adorer la Map. 7 February, LaGazette.fr, accessed 10 April
2013.
Paquier, J. (2013b) Le ﬁnancement des collectivités territoriales rénové par le Pacte de conﬁance et de
solidarité proposé par l’Etat. 16 July, LaGazette.fr, accessed 22 July 2013.
Pasquier, R. (2004) La Capacité politique des régions. Une comparaison France/Espagne. Rennes,
France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
Pasquier, R. (2012) Le Pouvoir Régional. Paris, France: Presses de Sciences Po.
Pasquier, R., Simoulin, V. and Weisbein, J. (eds.) (2013) La Gouvernance territoriale. Pratiques, discours
et théories. Paris: LGDJ.
Payre, R. (2010) The importance of being connected: City networks and urban government:
Lyon and Eurocities (1990–2005). International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34(2):
260–280.
Payre, R. and Pollet, G. (2013) Socio-histoire des sciences et savoirs de gouvernement. In: J.-M. Eymeri-
Douzans and G. Bouckaert (eds.) La France et ses administrations. Un état des savoirs. Brussels,
Belgium: Bruylant, pp. 133–150.
Péneau, V., Auvigne, F., Bellion, D., Jochum, J.-P. and Cronel, A. (2012) Réforme de l’Administration
territoriale de l’Etat, 2012-M-009-01 Paris, France: Inspection générale des ﬁnances.
Piatonni, S. (2010) The Theory of Multi-Level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pierson, P. (2000) Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics. American Political
Science Review 94(2): 251–267.
Pinson, G. (2009) Gouverner la ville par projet: Urbanisme et gouvernance des villes. Paris, France:
Presses de Sciences Po.
Pollitt, C. (2001) Convergence: The useful myth? Public Administration 79(4): 933–947.
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2004) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (1991) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Cole
134 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
Radaelli, C.M. (2005) Diffusion without convergence: How political context shapes the adoption of
regulatory impact assessment. Journal of European Public Policy 12(5): 924–943.
Raymond, G. (ed.) (2012) The Sarkozy Presidency. Breaking the Mould? Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Rennes Métropole (2013) Interview with Author.
République Française (2014) Loi n° 2014-58 du 27 janvier 2014 de modernisation de l’action publique
territoriale et d’afﬁrmation des métropoles. Journal Ofﬁciel 0023, 28 January.
Rose, R. (1991) What is lesson drawing? Journal of Public Policy 11(1): 3–30.
Sawicki, F. (2013) Political parties: The PS and the left. In: A. Cole, S. Meunier and V. Tiberj (eds.)
Developments in French Politics 5. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 104–119.
Schmidt, V. (2006) Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, V. (2007) Trapped by their ideas: French élites’ discourses of European integration and
globalization. Journal of European Public Policy 14(7): 992–1009.
Schmidt, V. (2008) Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and discourse. Annual
Review of Political Science 11: 303–326.
Schmidt, V. (2010) Taking ideas and discourse seriously: Explaining change through discursive
institutionalism as the fourth ‘new institutionalism’. European Political Science Review 2(1): 1–25.
Schmidt, V. (2011) Speaking of change: Why discourse is key to the dynamics of policy transformation.
Critical Policy Studies 5(2): 106–126.
Schondorf-Haubold, B. (2007) L’émergence d’un droit commun de l’autonomie territoriale en Europe.
Revue française d’administration publique 121–122: 203–218.
Steckel, M.-C. (2012) Une autonomie ﬁnancière altérée. In: S. Regourd, J. Carles and D. Guignard (eds.)
Réformes et mutations des collectivités territoriales. Paris, France: Harmattan, pp. 217–235.
Steinmo, S. (2008) Historical institutionalism. In: D. Della Porta and M. Keating (eds.) Approaches and
Methodologies in the Social Science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–138.
Sueur, J.-P. (2014) Opening address presented at the Senate Colloquium on the 30 Years of the Territorial
Public Service; 31 January, Paris, France.
Tilly, C. (2001) Mechanisms in political processes. Annual Review of Political Science 4: 21–41.
Vetter, A. (2010) Germany. In: M. Goldsmith and E. Page (eds.) Changing Government Relations in
Europe. London: ECPR Press, pp. 88–107.
Wollmann, H., Barboni, E., Gaudin, J.-P. and Marcou, G. (2010) The multi-level institutional setting in
Germany, Italy, France and the UK: A comparative overview. In: H. Wollmann and G. Marcou (eds.)
The Provision of Public services in Europe. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 15–48.
Zahariadis, N. (2012) Complexity, coupling and policy effectiveness: The European response to the Greek
sovereign debt crisis. Journal of Public Policy 32(2): 99–116.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
Unported License The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated
otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative
Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to
reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/3.0/
Not saying, not doing
135© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1476-3419 French Politics Vol. 12, 2, 104–135
